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Somalia’s Post-Conflict Economy: 
A Political Economy Approach1
Abdi Ismail Samatar
To do the impossible you must see the invisible.
Egyptian Development Expert
I. Introduction
Much discussion has taken place about reviving the Somali economy 
since the dawn of the new century.2 These conversations have not criti-
cally assessed what bedeviled the Somali economy during the tenure 
of the old regime and since its collapse. Further, no one has yet articu-
lated an appropriate framework that accounts for the country’s past 
and the ways in which a new Somali order can profitably learn from 
and engage with recent developments in the global environment. The 
factors that crippled the old order and that sustain the civil war must 
be identified and contained, if not fully controlled, during and after 
the transition. Among the ills that plague the Somali economy are 
structural constraints, mismanagement of public resources, a political 
elite whose preoccupation is looting the commons, lawlessness and 
warlord rule, and a disorganized public that failed to unite against a 
sectarian political agenda that stoked conflict between communities. 
The prospect that the transition will be economically successful is grim 
unless a conscious and concerted effort is made to reduce these politi-
cal liabilities.
The extreme lawlessness of the last one-and-a-half decades made 
the population’s working and living conditions exceptionally precari-
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ous, particularly in the south. Roaming militias destroyed farming 
communities and the rudimentary agricultural infrastructure. In many 
instances, a significant proportion of the farming population in the 
irrigated regions was dislocated and became internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs). Displacement was not limited to the riverine agrarian 
sector, as successive embargos by importing countries of the Middle 
East brought livestock exports, the mainstay of the economy, to a halt, 
except in the southern end of the country.3 In addition, many people 
lost their assets during the civil war. In Hargeisa and Garowe, where 
order was restored, regional authorities reinvented the old corrupt 
system in which the ruling strata and its clients use public power and 
resources as personal gifts. The only difference between their manage-
ment style and that of the old regime is that they do not have enough 
strength to control the market. The level of corruption in these areas 
and in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has equaled if not 
exceeded that of the Barre years. Elsewhere, warlords who control 
other areas, mostly in south-central Somalia, devastated the region as 
they turned any public resource capable of generating revenue into 
their booty, without restoring order.
The last two decades have also produced two new generations of 
Somalis who are not equipped to creatively engage with the 21st cen-
tury. Young people are the country’s most precious resource and their 
loss is tantamount to a miserable future. Another product of state-
lessness is the destruction of public trust. Barre’s regime tribalized 
government institutions, which undermined people’s confidence in 
public affairs. Warlords, factional, and regional leaders have turned 
genealogy into the dominant political identity. Such a degeneration 
has eroded communal cohesion and continues to block the pathways 
to deep reconciliation and social rehabilitation. Clanization of politi-
cal identity and the loss of two generations are profound liabilities 
that will frustrate economic reconstruction for years to come. Rescuing 
these two generations and rebuilding the social fabric by rehabilitating 
national identity are necessary prerequisites for sustainable economic 
recovery.4
The only silver lining to this gruesome tale is the remarkable initia-
tive most citizens undertook to fend for themselves. Some had created 
profitable enterprises while others had engaged in shadowy businesses 
(such as ecologically destructive charcoal export), which have earned 
them substantial fortunes. In addition, remittances from Somalis in the 
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diaspora, estimated at nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars, sup-
port a large section of the population.5
This essay examines three issues vital to reconstruction and long-
term sustainability. First, it describes the origins and nature of Soma-
lia’s economic crisis and developments focusing on livestock, farming, 
and fisheries. Without a grounded analysis of the old era and recent 
changes, it is not be possible to chart a viable development pathway. 
Part two introduces a conceptual framework that illustrates the nature 
of the state-market relations with a particular focus on governed mar-
kets. The final section provides a set of recommendations that map the 
way forward.
II. Framing the Crisis
Somalia’s underdevelopment has been exacerbated by reckless politi-
cal leadership that has mismanaged the country since the mid-1970s. 
The collapse of the state and political order in 1991 marked a water-
shed in Somali social and political history. Since that fateful year, 
Somalia has become synonymous with hopelessness. The language 
of doom is not analytically helpful, however, in understanding the 
origins and dynamics of social and political problems. A more apt con-
cept is crisis.6 Crisis refers to a condition in which existing economic 
and political circumstances cannot be reproduced along established 
norms. Economic crises occur when different productive sectors are 
unable to generate even minimal surpluses to repair the diminution of 
assets resulting from normal wear and tear. For example, rejuvenating 
overgrazed range resources in a pastoral economy requires a fallow 
period. If such an imperative is not attended to, livestock will not have 
enough feed, and long-term productive capacity of the range might be 
damaged. Consequently, livestock health will decline and so will the 
profitability of the sector. Such minimum reinvestment is never suf-
ficient if the sector is to contribute not only to its simple reproduction 
but to a growing economy. In other words, sustained underinvestment 
in productive assets yields diminishing returns that lead to a declining 
standard of living. If such a downward spiral is not urgently arrested 
and reversed, it will produce economic disaster. Therefore, a crisis is 
that transitional moment wherein the old order must be reinvented to 
prevent it from involution. Beyond this point, disaster strikes and the 
system becomes chaotic, characterized by its vulnerability to natural 
perturbations which impair livelihood chances for most people.
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Government plays a strategic role in exacerbating a crisis or reorient-
ing economic signals in order to regenerate economic vitality. But not 
all governments have the capacity to take charge. Only those authori-
ties who have legitimacy with the population possess the necessary 
credibility to lead the transformation. Legitimacy of state leadership 
may be garnered through a track record of delivering development 
and/or respecting the rule of law. Unaccountable leaders who have 
engaged in rentier economic policies and who have aggravated the 
crisis cannot be trusted with reform. Enduring illegitimacy develops 
into deep political crisis.7 Such a political crisis reinforces the economic 
predicament and leads to catastrophic conditions. Rent seeking and 
disregard for the supremacy of the law steadily undermine common 
values. The predatory state creates a society that is its mirror image.8 
Thus, catastrophe is the product of an ill-managed crisis.
The unnecessary death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis since 
the end of Barre’s dictatorship, and the dislocation of over three million 
people, are products of the combined effects of political and economic 
failure. Events of its last twenty years demonstrate that the tyran-
nical rent-seeking regime unhinged civic life and deepened poverty. 
The warlord- and faction leader-dominated disorder that has prevailed 
since the early 1990s in most regions of the country has ossified politi-
cal fragmentation and looted what was left of the collective goods. 
Such a blind economic and political alley has been difficult to break 
through. The common and fatalistic Somali utterance, “Wuxuun ba 
dicidoona” (Something positive will somehow happen), the byword of 
both the elite and the commoners, sounds inane today and has been 
replaced by utter despair.
If Somalis are to avoid the further protraction of the prevailing 
debilities and greater loss of life and property, they must clearly under-
stand where they have come from and the dynamics that produced 
their nightmare. A fundamental part of this history is the disarticulated 
structure of the economy.9 The Somali economy had four principal 
attributes. First, its organization perpetuated a mismatch between the 
basic needs of the people and the incentive structure set by the state 
and the market. Second, it relied on conditional foreign loans and 
grants as the sole source for investment and development, which rein-
forced the economic status quo. Third, the state, unsteadily controlled 
by factions of the elite, dominated the distribution of foreign aid, lead-
ing to misappropriation and misuse of resources and further political 
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instability. Fourth, very few public resources were directed to improve 
and expand agricultural production.10
Somalia’s collapse in 1991 was preceded by a long period in which 
socioeconomic conditions markedly and progressively deteriorated. A 
pivotal element in the evolution of the present situation was the con-
flict between competing factions of the elite over the control and use 
of the meager resources of the country.11 This struggle starved the pro-
ductive sector of the economy, which in turn intensified social cleav-
ages and communal strife.12 The crisis of the Somali economy, then, 
resulted from the underaccumulation of capital as well as the political 
illegitimacy of the ruling elite.13 It is generally assumed that all sectors 
of the economy suffered from the same maladies and, therefore, that 
the country was in a crisis. Such a monolithic conception of the prob-
lem often leads to a simplistic and generalized prescription for what 
was, in actuality, a multitude of liabilities.
This essay provides a political-economic analysis of the conditions 
that induced Somalia’s crisis. What follows investigates different man-
ifestations of the issue of capital underaccumulation in three compo-
nents of the Somali agrarian economy: the pastoral/livestock sector, 
the farming sector (i.e., export agriculture and grain/domestic produc-
tion), and fishing. This focus is warranted because of the absence of a 
vibrant industrial or service economy, and the fact that agriculture is 
the only productive area that holds the promise of growth and devel-
opment in the immediate future—that is, in terms of contributing to 
accumulation and livelihoods.
Although this paper concentrates on crop and livestock production, 
it does recognize the potential significance of other sectors. For exam-
ple, Somalia has a great potential for fisheries that has been untapped 
by the local population.
III. The Crisis of Pastoralism and the Livestock Economy14
Livestock production has been the dominant sector of the Somali econ-
omy in terms of employment and foreign exchange earnings for a 
long time. The health and vitality of the national economy was always 
contingent on the performance of this sector and will continue to be so 
in the near future, albeit at a reduced level. Consequently, a coherent 
understanding of the problems faced by the pastoral/livestock sector 
is essential for any attempt at reconstruction. To fully appreciate the 
dire condition of this crucial sector, we need to broaden our conceptual 
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horizon in assessing the dynamics and the nature of the pastoral sys-
tem.
A. Background
Most contemporary social analysts use the word pastoralism to char-
acterize those individuals and communities who make a living by 
raising livestock in semiarid regions. The term nomadism is used in 
similar fashion.15 This is historically and analytically imprecise, and 
most of the literature on the subject is either ill informed, outdated, or 
both. Pastoralism is a means of livestock production employed under a 
variety of social and historical conditions. The method or the tools of 
production do not define the nature of a social system; e.g., capitalism 
is not defined by the instruments or the methods used by produc-
ers, but rather by the social relations into which various groups enter 
in order to produce values and reproduce the existing social order. 
Consequently, pastoral livestock production can exist under several 
different social and economic systems.16 For example, communitarian 
pastoralism in pre-colonial Somali society was a social order in which 
the production of use values predominated. In contrast, contemporary 
Somali pastoralism is dominated by a commercial system and the pro-
duction of exchange values. The commercial system that prevails in 
the country can be thought of as peripheral capitalism. Thus, pastoral 
production has become central to the reproduction of a larger social con-
stellation dominated by the state and merchants.
Pre-colonial Somali society was stateless in character and all adult 
members were engaged in production. This system was fundamen-
tally communitarian in that it lacked an institutionalized social and 
economic hierarchy. This interpretation of Somali social history does 
not deny the existence of some communities (e.g., the riverine areas of 
the south) whose local social relations were at variance with the domi-
nant system. Nevertheless, the principal mode of production, com-
munitarian pastoralism, lacked the systematized forms of oppression 
associated with class societies. However, as Somali society became an 
integral part of the global capitalist system, beginning in the late 19th 
century, the forces of the world-system had a transformative effect 
upon it.
The transition from one social system to another entails the remak-
ing of previous social and property relations. The emerging order 
bears the imprint of the new age, although it retains aspects of the old 
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regime, such as the method and objects of production. Contemporary 
Somali social structure displays the emblem of capitalist transition, 
clearly heralding the passing of a way of life. Communitarian pasto-
ralism, through production and consumption of use values, sustained 
the producers without its major products circulating as a commodity, 
whereas contemporary pastoral production supports two additional 
and dominant social groups: the merchants and the state.
Pre-colonial Somalia was not isolated from the mercantile world. 
However, the external world and the logic of mercantilism had only a 
marginal influence over the reproduction of everyday life. It was only 
after livestock became the chief object of trade that the present social 
relations emerged. The constitution of pastoralist-merchant-state rela-
tions over the last century entailed the emergence of social classes and 
the gradual eclipse of communitarian pastoralism. This broad scheme 
provides an appropriate conceptual framework to delineate the gen-
esis and nature of the crisis in the sector.
The slow but steady decomposition of communitarian Somali tradi-
tions began in the 19th century with the imposition of colonial rule and 
the gradual “commodification” of livestock (i.e., the shift toward view-
ing livestock as a commodity). Livestock trade since the last decade of 
that century laid the foundation for the colonial and postcolonial econ-
omy. Among the earliest and most visible changes was the emergence 
of pastoralist-merchant-state relationships based on the livestock trade. 
The general history and organization of this trade have been dealt with 
elsewhere.17 Merchants have not been the only group that siphoned 
resources from pastoralists. The colonial state did so as well. Somali 
pastoralists have produced “surpluses” that have been captured by the 
state since the society first became a colony in the 1880s. In more recent 
years, livestock exports have been the single most important hard-cur-
rency earner, accounting for nearly 80–90 percent of the total annual 
foreign exchange earnings (until this trade was disrupted by the civil 
war in the north in 1988).
The development of merchant-pastoralist-state relationships in 
Somali society over the last century marks a definite break with pre-
colonial tradition. The relationships sketched above constitute the 
domestic matrix that shapes the configuration of changes taking place 
in pastoral areas. Such structural relationships between merchants and 
the state, on the one hand, and producers, on the other, bound the 
limits of this economy. Consequently, a key element in the contempo-
rary trauma of Somali pastoralism is its declining capacity to sustain 
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the intensifying reproduction requirements of the producers, the mer-
chants, and the state class.
In the highly commercialized context of Somali livestock produc-
tion, little is known about the degree of internal differentiation among 
pastoralists.18 However, property relations in the rangeland have not 
been formally restructured, and the process of privatizing community 
resources is not advanced, although the enclosure of the pastoral com-
mons has increased significantly since 1991.19 In the absence of direct 
appropriation of Somali rangeland by non-pastoral producers, many 
students of Somali society continue to assume the vitality of a pre-
capitalist social system. In view of this, the pastoral-merchant-state 
relationship first established during the colonial era seems stable and 
often problem-free to most Somalists. Their argument has been that 
pastoralists, by selling their livestock, earn a return sufficient to enable 
them to purchase basic foods and other goods, while merchants make 
profits sufficient to sustain themselves, and the state collects taxes and 
gains precious foreign exchange.20
Pastoralists’ production of an indigenous food commodity and its 
subsequent export appeared to satisfy three often contradictory objec-
tives of development in Africa: the need to earn foreign exchange, the 
necessity to maintain or increase domestic food production, and the 
desire for a wider distribution of income. This view of Somali society, 
premised on communitarian pastoralism and subsequently perpetu-
ated by Somalist scholarship, conceals the qualitative transformation 
of social relations described earlier. More significantly, such a concep-
tion fails to grasp the problem of reproduction in the existing social 
formation, to which this essay now turns.
B. Transformation and Conjuncture
Scholarly literature on Somali development seldom addresses directly 
the reproduction of the pastoral-merchant-state relationship. The only excep-
tions are certain works by Jeremy Swift and Dan Aronson.21 Swift was 
the first researcher to point to the deterioration of pastoral barter terms 
of trade after the turn of the century. He noted that the commercializa-
tion of pastoral life brought about the decomposition of traditional 
Somali social relations. The disintegration of the pre-capitalist Somali 
pastoral system under the tutelage of commercial capital led to eco-
logical degradation and increased pastoral vulnerability to the fluctua-
tions of the semiarid climatic regime. Aronson extends this analysis by 
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indicating that Somali pastoralists are caught in an exploitative trap 
engineered by the state elite and the merchants.
Swift and Aronson’s studies are significant contributions because 
they call for a new direction for Somali (pastoral) development research. 
These studies, however, suffer from one major weakness. Written at a 
time when livestock prices were very high and the merchants and state 
elite were enjoying tremendous windfalls, they overlook the structural 
weakness of the system. In other words, although both are sympathetic 
to the position of the pastoralists and their future, neither author rec-
ognized the structural weaknesses of the relationship or the struggle 
over its reproduction.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Somali livestock export earnings were 
enhanced by the simultaneous development of oil resources in Saudi 
Arabia and the significant increase in the number of livestock-sac-
rificing pilgrims to the Islamic holy land.22 The oil price shocks of 
the early 1970s and the resultant phenomenal growth of petrodollars 
in Saudi Arabia led to a construction boom. Consequently, shortages 
of both skilled and unskilled labor in Saudi Arabia necessitated the 
importation of thousands of workers from the Middle East, Northeast 
Africa, and South Asia, which in turn led to increased demand for food 
imports, particularly meat. The growth in the demand for meat and the 
global inflationary pressures of the period drove up livestock prices 
enormously. Somalia, which initially accounted for nearly 90 percent 
of Saudi livestock imports (particularly during the Hajj season), reaped 
fantastic windfalls for the whole decade.23 For example, the prices of 
sheep/goats, cattle, and camels increased between 1960 and 1978 from 
about $8, $30, and $40 to $44, $195, and $278 per head, respectively. 
Such increases in livestock prices far outstripped the domestic inflation 
rates of the period.
The 1980s were not as kind to the Somali livestock export trade 
as the 1970s. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia’s buoyant market attracted 
suppliers from as far away as Australia. Such internationalization 
of the supply chain in the 1980s triggered a tremendous increase in 
the supply of livestock, with the consequent downward pressure on 
prices. The sudden decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s, the resultant 
financial difficulties in Saudi Arabia, and the globalization of the live-
stock trade in the Middle East intensified competition in the industry. 
Somalia’s authoritarian regime was ambivalent about losing its share 
of the reduced market in the oil kingdom. Consequently, it enacted a 
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substantial reduction of Somali livestock prices in January 1985 (see 
Table 1).
The decline in livestock prices, coupled with the long-term stagna-
tion in the quantity of animals exported (livestock exports peaked 
in 1972), presented a grave threat to the established social relations 
between pastoralists, merchants, and the state. This threat came in the 
form of declining terms of trade for producers, declining profits for the 
merchants, and reduced foreign exchange earnings for the state. For 
the pastoralists, the threat induced by the price squeeze might have 
meant a reduction in their basic level of subsistence. In the past, they 
were able to mitigate such pressures by increasing their livestock hold-
ings and exploiting more marginal areas. However, this time-tested 
strategy was no longer effective because virtually all the marginal land 
exploitable under current methods of production had been put to use.
A common but unexamined belief among many Somalists is that 
pastoralists, whose superior skills have been honed by centuries of 
experience, are the most appropriate custodians of the pastoral range.24 
This contention notwithstanding, the lore and appropriate skills of the 
pastoralist, which made the semiarid region productive and profit-
able, have been progressively undermined by the scarcity of accessible 
rangeland and an ecological deterioration generated by the commodi-
fication of pastoralism under a peripheral capitalist regime.25 Pastoral-
ists are increasingly hemmed in by the growing population, limited 
rangelands, and the overuse of the commons. This situation is ren-
dering pre-capitalist pastoral knowledge and management systems 
defunct or incapable of sustaining this form of commercial pastoral 
production. In this sense, the prevailing situation of Somali livestock 
production echoes the condition of the rural economy in Botswana in 
the early 1970s:
Table 1. Official Livestock Prices (in $/head)a
 Before
 January 1984  After January 1985 Percent change in price
Sheep 53 42 -20.76
Cattle 280 213 -23.93
Camelb 450 390 -13.13
Source: A. Samatar, “Social Classes,” p. 112.
Notes: a. Export prices fluctuated but were consistently higher in years prior to 1985.
 b.  Although there has not been an increase in the downward pressure on camel 
  export prices, camel prices declined because of the generalized price reduction 
  policy of the regime. Such losses were unnecessary.
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By the early 1970s the situation in the rural areas was nearly chaotic, 
yielding the possibility of a long-term damage to the environment and 
apparently providing absolute limits to the further development of 
[commercial] cattle production. The conditions for the expansion of that 
production in the 1960s became its fetters in the 1970s.26
The stagnation of livestock exports, the diminishing capacity of the 
rangelands, downward pressures on livestock prices, and skyrocket-
ing domestic inflation finally exposed the exploitative and unproduc-
tive relations between the claimant classes and the rural producers. 
Such pressure on prices and the profit squeeze on the system could 
perhaps be treated in the short run by simply redistributing the losses. 
However, in the long run, reproduction of these relations will require a 
significant restructuring of the system.
Livestock merchants were differentially affected by the price 
squeeze. Although merchants constitute a class as defined by their 
relations to the producers, they are by no means a monolithic group. 
For example, the 923 livestock exporters based in the hinterland of 
the main city of Berbera from 1981–1986 can be differentiated into 
three strata on the basis of the number of animals they exported and 
the profits they obtained. The distribution of livestock exports among 
the merchants indicates a process of social differentiation wherein 
this class is segmented into poor, middle, and rich merchants. The 
three groups are those who exported from 1–9,999, 10,000–49,000, and 
50,000–149,000 animals, respectively. Category One merchants con-
sisted mainly of those whose operations were barely sufficient to sat-
isfy their requirements for basic subsistence. Their median sale was 
about 580 animals annually, with a corresponding profit of $1,740 (the 
minimum net profit per sheep or goat was $3). Middle-size merchants’ 
median export was 4,500 animals annually, with a profit of $12,600. By 
contrast, the median sale of the rich strata was 12,500 animals annually, 
with a profit of $37,500. About 85 percent of the merchant population 
fell into the indigent camp, and 12 percent and 3 percent belong to the 
middle and rich strata, respectively. This means that the top 15 percent 
of the merchant class accounted for about 70 percent of the sales and, 
hence, for the industry’s profits.
Based on the above distribution of sales and profits, it seems that 
the three strata of merchants have contrasting reproduction require-
ments in spite of their common class base. In other words, the priority 
of the poor group, under prevailing conditions, was simply to survive 
Abdi Ismail Samatar
137
as merchants; they had little prospect of enhancing their location in 
the hierarchy. It is important to note here the common assumption 
in Somalia that most livestock merchants are in the profitable import 
trade and consequently have large real estate investments. Such a per-
ception is contradicted by the results of field research. Of the seventy 
indigent merchants interviewed, only two had real estate properties, 
and none were involved in the import trade. In contrast, the decline 
in export prices has reduced the profit margins of the middle and rich 
merchants, but did not endanger their immediate status as one of the 
wealthiest groups in the country. Most of the members of these two 
groups were heavily involved in the import trade and had relatively 
extensive real estate properties in major towns and cities. However, 
over the long haul, a continuing decline in export prices and the long-
term stagnation of the number of animals exported boded ill, even 
prior to the dissolution of social order, for the future of middle and rich 
merchants. This was because their capacity to import commodities (in 
the lucrative import trade) has always been contingent on the avail-
ability of foreign exchange.27
Finally, the Somali state, strapped for foreign exchange, was further 
impoverished by the combined effect of the drop in export prices and 
the stagnation of livestock exports. In the absence of other domestic 
sources of foreign exchange, its reliance on external assistance intensi-
fied, deepening the disconnection and alienation between the state and 
society.
The fortunes of the sector have not changed substantially since 
1991. Livestock trade nearly came to a standstill in the early 1990s, but 
slowly recovered and peaked at about 2.9 million in 1997. Saudi Ara-
bia’s two import bans of Somali livestock, due to the claimed presence 
of rift valley fever, significantly slowed down exports. Consequently, 
Somali merchants have begun to diversify their export markets into 
the United Arab Emirates. Others in the southernmost regions have 
redirected trade towards Kenya, while a handful of entrepreneurs have 
established small abattoirs and ship chilled meat to other destinations 
in the Middle East.
It was recently suggested that the producers capture 85–92% of the 
free-on-board (FOB) price,28 but the evidence to sustain this assertion is 
slim. First, the analysis on which this statement is based did not con-
sider the fact that several intermediaries exist between the producer 
and the export merchant. The exactions by these actors reduce returns 
to the producer. Second, evidence from the late 1990s suggests that the 
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barter terms of trade for producers has not improved, particularly after 
the Saudi ban on exports. Such lacuna is due to the limited scope of the 
analysis. Structural relations—social and ecological—that limited the 
sector’s robustness remain in place despite the recovery of the export 
trade. Unless these barriers are carefully examined, the sector and the 
larger economy will not recover and prosper.
C. The Crisis in the Farm Sector
Crop production is the other main productive area of the country’s 
economy. This sector consists of the peasant-dominated grain pro-
ducing area, and the export-oriented fruit (mainly banana) plantation 
enterprises. As in the pastoral sector, which produces food for both 
export and domestic consumption, grain and banana production con-
tribute to the internal and external accounts as well. However, national 
grain production has usually fallen far short of satisfying domestic 
needs, although the potential for growth is particularly great in irri-
gated areas.
Despite the promise, the sector suffered from maladies somewhat 
similar to those that bedeviled the livestock economy. The crop sector’s 
afflictions were the result of woefully rudimentary tools of production, 
environmental problems, absence of agrarian services, mismanaged 
markets, arbitrary price controls, and an impoverished labor force. 
These political-economic and ecological factors articulated differ-
ently in the grain-producing areas than in the banana economy. The 
combination of these factors limited the sector’s capacity to produce 
sufficient output to provide for farmers as well as to satisfy other 
domestic needs. Thus, the crisis of the crop sector was defined by the 
mismatch between its potential capacity to produce larger quantities of 
food and exports, the growing needs of an increasing population, and 
the absence of legitimate government institutions that could facilitate 
appropriate and necessary reforms. This structure reinforced the rural 
population’s vulnerability to climatic cycles and deepened poverty.
Somalia’s agrarian crises are embedded in the institutional order left 
behind by the former colonial governments and the regimes that have 
reigned ever since. The warlords and regional faction leaders have 
turned the crisis into a calamity. Future attempts to reform the system 
must therefore deal gingerly with the factors that impede progress in 
order to enable peasants and others who work in the sector to become 
more productive and earn sufficient returns for their toil.
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1. The Grain Sector
Somalia was a grain-deficient country long before the military regime’s 
tenure and the disaster since the 1990s. Unlike the civilian governments 
that preceded it, the junta proclaimed its commitment to a policy of 
food self-sufficiency.29 Although this new strategy increasingly relied 
on state farms and agricultural crash programs to provide for the bulk 
of the country’s food needs, such projects never yielded more than a 
fraction of their planned targets. Consequently, the country never pro-
duced enough food for itself, and, state neglect notwithstanding, the 
peasantry remained the principal producer of food grains. State-peas-
ant relations during the 1970s were characterized by (1) an extraction 
of resources through both price controls and forced produce deliveries 
(through marketing boards) and (2) absolute neglect in the provision of 
credit and other necessary agricultural inputs.30 The net results of this 
strategy were a decline in crop production and stagnation (see Table 
2).
Although the sharp declines in grain production from 1970–1980 
were in some years certainly due to unfavorable climatic conditions 
(e.g., the 1973–1974 drought), the principal cause for the decade-long 
failure to make progress toward national food self-sufficiency was 
inappropriate agricultural policy. The state-inspired approach during 
this period reflected the opportunistic and quasi-nationalist predis-
positions of the governing elite. Without much understanding of the 
needs of peasant producers or the technical requirements of food pro-
duction in the peasant environment, the regime imposed a rigid policy 
that undermined its own objective of food self-reliance. Government 
leaders had two reasons for adopting such a strategy. First, under the 
tutelage of the Soviets, they believed that controlling the marketing 
of agricultural produce was “proof” of their socialist orientation. Sec-
ond, the strategy brought an important sector of the economy under 
the ambit of the regime and therefore provided an avenue to employ 
more bureaucrats to make good on the inflated promises made on the 
morrow of the coup. Consequently, the expansion of an unproductive 
bureaucratic class at the cost of robust and thriving rural production 
foreclosed a vibrant agrarian sector.
The introduction of neo-liberal economic reform, a result of the 1981 
structural adjustment agreement between the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the Somali government, eliminated both price controls 
and mandatory grain deliveries to the state. These reforms, coinciding 
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with favorable rains, reversed the stagnation of the 1970s. However, a 
critical factor in the resulting increase in grain production was exten-
sive horizontal expansion, rather than an improvement in the pro-
ductivity (or intensive use) of land.31 Sorghum and maize cultivation 
increased from a low 109,000 and 460,000 hectares, respectively, at the 
end of the 1970s to 259,500 hectares and 516,200 hectares in 1987 (see 
Table 3). Sesame and beans showed similar trends. All of the grains 
in Table 3 (except rice), particularly maize and sorghum, are rain-fed 
crops produced by peasants.
Rice production was stable for the first half of the 1970s but grew 
significantly in the latter half of the decade. However, the area under 
rice cultivation fell from 6,000 hectares in 1982 to 1,000 hectares in 1983. 
Before 1983, rice, unlike other grains, was primarily grown on large 
estates. Located near the towns of Jowhar and Jilib, these estates were 
managed as parastatals by the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the 
producer prices for other grains were significantly below the global 
market price during the periods of price controls, that of rice was 
Table 2. Production of Food and Nonfood Crops, 1970-1986 
(in thousands of metric tons)
      Output
  Sugar,    index
 Grains, beans, vegetables, Total Nonfood Total (relative to
 and oil seeds and fruits food output crops output  1970)
1970 342.2 376.6 718.8 1.3 720.1 100
1971 278.6 375.7 654.3 1.0 655.3 91
1972 323.4 377.3 700.7 1.2 701.9 97
1973 229.3 390.2 619.5 1.1 620.6 86
1974 274.2 379.2 653.4 1.0 654.4 91
1975 294.3 333.4 627.7 1.1 628.8 87
1976 350.7 333.2 683.9 1.2 685.1 95
1977 319.0 320.1 639.1 1.2 640.3 89
1978 313.1 327.8 640.9 1.2 642.1 89
1979 312.3 312.0 624.3 1.5 625.8 87
1980 315.9 316.8 632.7 1.5 634.2 88
1981 449.3 338.0 787.3 1.1 788.4 109
1982 478.1 349.4 827.5 1.8 829.3 115
1983 444.8 364.0 808.8 1.5 810.3 112
1984 563.7 394.4 958.1 1.5 959.6 133
1985 634.0 398.0 1,032.0 5 1,032.5 143
1986 713.0 365.6 1,078.6 1.5 1,080.1 150
Source: World Bank, Somalia: Agricultural Sector Survey.
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almost identical to the world market price.32 Regardless, farmers were 
unable to take advantage of the high price for rice because they had 
to sell their produce to the state marketing board. The decline in culti-
vated area during the 1982–83 season was due to abandonment of state 
farm production brought about by the reform process. Its recovery was 
slow as peasant farmers steadily readjusted to the new policy environ-
ment.
The 1980s was a decade of growth in the grain-producing areas of 
the country (see Table 2). There was significant improvement in grain 
production in both rain-fed farming regions and the irrigated areas of 
the Shabelle and Juba rivers. As noted earlier, this growth was largely 
a product of the horizontal expansion of cultivation and reclamation 
of farmland abandoned during the era of price controls. In spite of the 
promising circumstances, these gains were not sustainable because 
they entailed either (1) bringing more marginal or fragile land into 
cultivation in rain-fed areas or (2) neglecting institutional support for 
the relatively high-potential irrigated river valleys. As an illustration 
of the problems of the grain sector, consider irrigated rice production 
in the Jowhar Valley along the Shabelle as a case in point. The Shabelle 
river valley around the town of Jowhar is a flat, fertile, alluvial plain. 
It is less than 500 feet above sea level and about 60 miles northeast of 
the capital. Average annual rainfall in the valley is about 600 millime-
ters. The Shabelle River, which meanders through the valley, dries up 
in most years between the months of January and March. Historically, 
the valley was home to peasants and pastoralists. However, after the 
Italian colonization of southern Somalia, it attracted many investment 
projects.
The first and largest investment was a sugar plantation and an asso-
ciated sugar mill. This plantation/mill complex was established in 
1920. Initially owned by Italian colonial interests and later taken over 
by the Somali government, the enterprise dominated the town of Jow-
har and the surrounding area. At the height of its operations in the 
early 1970s, the complex produced enough refined sugar to meet the 
country’s domestic needs. It has since declined from production val-
ued at $50 million in 1970 to $15 million in 1981,33 and to complete 
collapse in 1988–1989. The demise of the sugar complex devastated the 
local economy. Mismanagement, the hallmark of the military regime, 
and the apparent siphoning of enterprise resources for the private use 
of senior national and regional public officials killed the enterprise, 
although the demand for sugar was growing. The experience of the 
Bildhaan  Vol. 7
142
sugar industry is a telling example of the ills of poorly managed public 
enterprises and the negative consequences for communities all over 
the country.
Rice production was introduced to the valley in the 1960s. This eco-
nomic program began at an experiment station five kilometers north-
east of Jowhar through a project sponsored by the People’s Republic 
of China. The purpose was to explore whether Somalia could grow 
enough rice to meet a significant part of its own increasing demand. 
At the end of the decade, the experimental phase was completed, and 
the staff at the station began to encourage its field laborers, most of 
whom were peasants from the nearest villages, to plant rice in small 
plots on their land.34 By the mid-1970s, a small but increasing num-
ber was growing rice. The station supported the efforts of these peas-
ants by providing advice on improved cultivation methods and seeds. 
Before this effort had a chance to blossom, however, the newly estab-
lished Agricultural Development Corporation, a marketing parastatal, 
imposed price controls and mandatory deliveries on rice and other 
Table 3. Cropped Areas in Somalia, 1970-1987 (in thousands of hectares)
 Total crop
 Landa Maize Sorghum Rice Wheat Beans Groundnuts Sesame
1970 571 133 290 1.3 0.9 21.9 3.3 73
1971 500.4 102 280 1.4 0.6 17.8 2.6 44
1972 638 117 390 1.2 0.8 20.8 3.3 57
1973 591.8 101 345 1.2 3.5 17.9 2.9 77
1974 580.7 99 330 1.4 3.5 17.6 2.8 84
1975 641.1 106 400 1.6 3.5 18.8 3.3 57
1976 733.5 119 490 1.8 3.5 19.7 3.5 45
1977 764.5 150.6 458.3 4.4 3.5 18.8 2.5 75
1978 730.8 148.7 420.1 9.8 3.5 21.8 1.9 75
1979 765 147.5 460.8 4.8 3.5 16.6 2.4 80
1980 730.8 109 456.8 5.9 3.5 18.5 2.5 83
1981 896 197 517 5.7 3.5 25.9 2.6 90
1982 931.9 209 540 6.0 3.5 27.0 3.0 90
1983 745.5 218.6 335.5 1.0 3.6 27.0 3.0 98.4
1984 964.7 220 544.7 1.3 3.6 38.1 4.7 92
1985 909.1 234.3 447 2.6 3.6 46.8 5.2 109.2
1986 802.7 245.1 385 3.2 0.3 28.9 2.9 81
1987 984.8 259.5 516.2 3.6 0.0 48.3 4.2 104.7
Source: Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Early Warning.
Note: a. Total cropland is greater than the sum of crops listed because not all of the land
  that could be cultivated is cultivated.
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crops. This policy effectively stopped the expansion of peasant rice cul-
tivation because farmers who were already cultivating the crop aban-
doned it altogether within two years. Between 1974/1975 and 1983, rice 
was grown only at the experiment station and at state farms elsewhere. 
However, the promise of improving food self-sufficiency through a 
farm-based strategy (particularly in terms of rice) disappeared.
The town of Jowhar and the surrounding villages in the Shabelle 
Valley were economically devastated from 1974–1984 by the disinte-
gration of the sugar complex, and the modest expansion in rice pro-
duction was insufficient to make up for other losses. Relaxation of 
price controls in the early 1980s was a necessary but insufficient condi-
tion to rekindle peasant enthusiasm. An initiative of a German private 
voluntary organization (PVO), AgroAction, and its offer of material 
support to two peasant communities were the catalyst that helped reju-
venate rice production in the Jowhar Valley. The experiment station, 
which was transformed into a moderately successful state-run rice 
farm, was there to provide the necessary seeds, advice, and some other 
services.35 The new initiative took off within two years. The growing 
economic crisis of the country, the increasing price of food staples, and 
the liberalization of land tenure laws made rice production the most 
attractive productive investment for anyone who could muster enough 
resources to get access to irrigated land. It was not long before many 
non-peasants (e.g., merchants, bureaucrats) started producing rice.36 
By the winter/spring growing season of 1990, peasant rice producers 
were outnumbered by urban-based growers, who used hired labor to 
work their land.
Initially, most of these new farmers rented or borrowed land from 
peasants and other owners who had extra acreage. As more people 
discovered the gains to be made, land prices skyrocketed (from about 
the equivalent of U.S. $25 per hectare per growing season to over U.S. 
$125 per hectare per season in the fall of 1989). With rent and the price 
of irrigable land escalating and economic conditions in the country 
sliding further, a land rush ensued. Much riverine land previously 
utilized by peasants and pastoralists for grazing and other purposes 
was carved up by urbanites, many of who were well connected to the 
state. For instance, most of the irrigable land along the Shabelle in the 
Jowhar Valley was expropriated through administrative fiat, without 
regard being paid to those who traditionally used it. Titles to some 
of this land were then given to the favorite sons and daughters of the 
regime. By the spring of 1990, urban-based farmers dominated the 
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industry and accounted for most of the rice produced in the area. Of 
the estimated 1,500 rice growers in the valley, nearly three-fourths were 
urban. Although no one knew the exact area under rice cultivation in 
the valley, estimates range from 5,000–6,000 hectares. This growth is 
substantial, particularly because non-state rice farming barely existed 
before 1983.
The preceding discussion of rice production in the Jowhar Valley 
indicates that the neo-liberal reform program had induced growth in 
the region. Such growth reflects only one side, albeit the positive one, 
of the impact that the program had on the agrarian economy. The other 
area in which the impact of the reform program was felt was agricul-
ture-related public institutions. Here, forces were set in motion that 
went beyond production and affected the capacity of public institu-
tions.37 Among the principal aims of the IMF/World Bank-sponsored 
liberalization program were the contraction of the state as a source of 
employment and the deregulation of the economy in order to reduce 
bureaucratic red tape, economic mismanagement, and resource mis-
use.
The greatest changes in the public sector generated by the reform 
program were not the employment reductions in that sector or the 
degree of state intervention in the economy, but rather a subversion 
of the ethic of public service and an elevation of greed to new heights. 
Moreover, a loss of income brought about by new levels of inflation, 
combined with the liberalization of prices, severely eroded public 
employee incomes and ultimately led to the decay of public service. 
As the reform program unfolded and the monetarist strategy took 
hold, inflation rose dramatically. This drove the private sector to adjust 
its operations by increasing prices and wages at a comparable rate. 
In contrast, the state failed to do the same, thereby allowing public 
employee wages to decline precipitously. Thus, the new “prosperity” 
in the private sector made the incomes of public employees, including 
senior ones, seem paltry. In essence, public employees were expected 
to facilitate the accumulation of private wealth without earning a liv-
ing wage. As a result, public servants ruthlessly began to exploit their 
offices for personal gain. Such ethics brought ruin to the state’s capac-
ity to manage public property, and undermined agricultural develop-
ment, as the following case demonstrates.
The Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training project 
(AEFMET) was planned and designed to overcome the managerial and 
technical inadequacy of the Ministry of Agriculture.38 The project was 
Abdi Ismail Samatar
145
funded by World Bank loans from its inception in the late 1970s until 
the disintegration of the regime in January 1991. Despite the initial 
intentions of its designers, AEFMET was appropriated by the rentier 
structure.
The project’s principal mission was to improve agricultural pro-
ductivity, particularly for small farms. It was expected to popular-
ize new and improved methods of cultivation and husbandry. One of 
AEFMET’s important regional offices was in the Middle Shabelle, out-
side the regional capital of Jowhar, in one of the two most important 
agricultural regions in the country. It is in this location that the new 
crop, rice, had taken root and was beginning to flourish. Rice produc-
ers, particularly peasants who were eager to expand and intensify pro-
duction, were in desperate need of technical support and guidance, in 
the form of timely tractor service, fertilizers, herbicides, and properly 
operated irrigation systems. However, getting access to these neces-
sary inputs at a reasonable price proved virtually impossible for the 
majority, and the dogged few had to spend inordinate amounts of time 
and resources to procure these necessary inputs.
Why did AEFMET’s provisional and national staff pay so little 
attention to the needs of rice farmers in the Middle Shabelle? Both the 
regional officers and the general manager engaged in rentier activity. 
First, the general manager owned a large farm of over 100 hectares 
along the banks of the river. He took proprietorship of this land in the 
early 1980s, when laws were relaxed and liberalized. The farm was 
not bought but was simply a “grant” from the Ministry of Agriculture; 
and the equipment that went into leveling and preparing it for cultiva-
tion was publicly owned. Moreover, project vehicles were consistently 
used for personal and farm-related purposes. In addition, the regional 
director of AEFMET would often lend resources and personal assis-
tance to the general manager’s farm operations. He also spent some 
of his energy securing project-sponsored scholarships for students to 
do graduate work in the United States. In the course of these efforts, 
the regional director had to serve the interests of his superior and not 
the public. In a nutshell, the resources of the project were captured 
by rentiers who were not accountable to anyone. But this practice did 
not dissuade the World Bank from continuing to fund the project, 
thereby burdening the Somali public with more debt but without much 
improvement in agricultural services.
This entire edifice collapsed in January 1991 and chaos became the 
norm. Peasants and other rural producers were able to work their land, 
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though on a limited scale, during the tyranny of the military regime. 
Looting and dispossession have been the fate of most farmers since 
the inception of the warlord era. A few NGOs have attempted to pro-
vide some services to farmers, but their reach and scope are limited. 
Some degree of stability has returned to the Jowhar Valley since a 
new warlord took over the region in the late 1990s. This has enabled 
some farmers to start producing rice again although they do not have 
access to essential services. Other irrigated regions have fared worse 
than Jowhar, and stability has yet to be restored. Further, a significant 
proportion of the irrigated farms has been confiscated by warlords and 
violent gangs, while the legitimate owners languish in camps as inter-
nally dispossessed persons. Finally, the rain-fed farming region that 
lies between the two perennial rivers continues to be unstable, while 
farmers in the northwest have been working their farms for most of the 
past decade without any institutional support.
2. Export Sector
When the military regime proclaimed its “scientific socialist” creden-
tials in 1970, the banana economy of the two river valleys was the 
most developed capitalist production process in the entire country. 
Both labor and agricultural land in the region, particularly on planta-
tions, were highly commodified. Furthermore, the working conditions 
of both bonded and temporary labor, particularly the former, were 
characteristically colonial. The plantation system in southern Somalia 
clearly presented the regime with an opportunity to implement the 
“received idea” of socialism.39 Abiding by the tenets of the doctrine 
and conscious of the constraints imposed on it by the underdeveloped 
structure of its economy, the regime had several options in dealing 
with the plantation question. First, it could take the standard doc-
trinaire approach by simply appropriating the plantations and turn-
ing them into state farms. Second, given its proclaimed commitment 
to self-reliance and food self-sufficiency, it could gradually transform 
these estates into food-producing farms run by quasi-public agencies. 
Third, the regime could put forth farm labor legislation to enhance the 
bargaining power and well-being of farm workers. This method could 
have enabled the regime to avoid some of the pitfalls associated with 
state farms and the supposed loss of foreign exchange. The fourth pol-
icy option was to enact and implement land reform. Had this alterna-
tive been selected, it may have necessitated a shift away from banana 
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production, unless some kind of a small, farmer-based contract system 
had also been introduced.
Surprisingly, the military regime did not adopt any of the now famil-
iar radical agrarian reform strategies. Its first legislative act concerning 
the plantation economy was to take over the banana-marketing appa-
ratus previously run by a settler organization. This step gave birth 
to the National Banana Board, assigned to “manage” the industry. 
Whatever its intended function, the Board had little positive impact 
on the plantation economy. Banana output increased from 145,500 tons 
in 1970 to 168,300 tons in 1973. The area under cultivation grew from 
6,500 cultivated hectares to 9,500 hectares. Such growth was the result 
of investments and improvements made before 1969 or immediately 
after the regime came to power. The regime also retained the power of 
supreme landlord. In addition, the state’s general ban on the formation 
of independent labor unions and industrial action, coupled with the 
severity of military justice, foreclosed any possibility for progressive 
social action in the plantation economy. Labor functioned under condi-
tions no different from those prevailing during the colonial order or 
civilian regimes. In addition, property and social relations inherited 
largely from Italian fascist rule remained the basis of the plantation 
system.
In spite of the growth and expansion of the banana economy in the 
early 1970s, production began its downward spiral in 1974. The area 
under cultivation fell by more than 50 percent, from its peak in 1973 
to 3,600 hectares in 1981. Fruit production hit rock bottom in 1981 
at 59,000 tons, less than a third of the 1973 output. The downturn in 
production has been attributed to various maladies: (1) the erosion of 
technical know-how as a result of the departure of many of the Ital-
ian planters; (2) increased soil salinity as a result of poor drainage 
systems; (3) lack of good field supervision; (4) extremely low fertilizer 
application (approximately 100 kilograms per hectare, as opposed to 
the standard 800 kilograms per hectare); and (5) low export prices and 
increased domestic costs of production, i.e., packaging and transport.40
The banana economy was in dire straits in the early 1980s, as were 
the rest of the country’s productive sectors. The diplomatic rift between 
the regime and the Soviets in the late 1970s, the realignment of the 
country’s foreign relations toward the West, and, finally, the adoption 
of structural adjustment as a development strategy changed the for-
tunes of the plantation economy. The confluence of these conditions 
spelled the inauguration of a neo-liberal economic policy, prompt-
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ing Italian interests to initiate new negotiations with the government 
regarding private investment in the banana sector. These discussions 
were successful, and an agreement was signed that established Somal-
fruit in 1983. Somalfruit, a joint venture, was dominated by the Italian 
group, De Nadai.41
De Nadai, through Somalfruit, made credit and agricultural inputs 
available to producers and invested in irrigation and marketing. 
Consequently, slow but steady progress was made in revitalizing the 
industry.42 Except during 1984 and 1985, when the river valleys were 
flooded and the crops damaged, banana exports steadily increased 
until the disintegration of the country in 1991 (see Table 4). Somalfruit, 
which was responsible for mending the industry, deserves the credit 
for expanding production and restoring export quality. Moreover, 
these achievements and other incentive systems increased returns to 
the planter, as will be shown later.
The steady transformation and recovery of the banana economy 
were held up as a model that the rest of the economy would do well 
to emulate. Growth of the industry was said to be symbolic of the 
viability and developmental consequences of collaboration between 
international capital, the state, and local entrepreneurs (the so-called 
triple alliance). Such a contention is partially valid; however, it over-
looks some important drawbacks of the banana economy. Although De 
Nadai’s investments in the sector did remarkably transform the planta-
tion system and improve its profitability, the benefits from the growth 
and expansion of the industry added little to the well-being of those 
who labored in the fields, or to that of the region and the country as a 
whole. Unlike the livestock sector, the problem in the banana economy 
Table 4. Banana Production and Value of Exports, 1983–1989
    Total value
 Area   (in millions Percent
 (in hectares) Tons Dollars/ton of dollars) value changea
1983 — 62,448 235 14.7 —
1984 4,592.7 47,860 278 14.3 –2.7
1985 5,121.8 45,321 287 13.0 –9.1
1986 6,150.8 57,943 295 17.0 30.8
1987 6,128.9 64,004 320 20.5 20.6
1988 6,509.9 73,368 320 32.5 58.5
1989 6,434.6 74,652 332 24.9 –23.4
Source: Somalfruit, Statistical Reports. Note: Calculated by author.
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was one in which some of the most productive agricultural land was 
used to benefit senior members of the old regime, the Italian firm, and 
fewer than 200 Somali owners.
Banana production is highly labor intensive, and there are over fif-
teen essential tasks that need to be performed regularly from planting 
to harvest. Female children, whose ages ranged from 8 to 15, under-
took the overwhelming majority of these tasks. The children who har-
vested bananas typified the poverty of those who worked in this more 
lucrative sector. Their average daily wages amounted to less than U.S. 
$0.10 (see Table 5), although the working day began at about 8:30 in the 
morning and usually ended around 7:00 in the evening, with a lunch 
break around 1:00 in the afternoon. Those engaged in harvest activity 
were given a midday meal consisting of cooked bananas with a touch 
of cooking oil and a sprinkling of sugar. Their wages were supple-
mented by some bananas to take home. Such low rates of remuneration 
were not enough to buy more than a loaf of bread or five cups of tea or 
a kilogram of rice. These were dreadfully low wages, but the children 
continued to work under such conditions because unemployment was 
so high in the region and the country. Most adult males were unwilling 
to work for such wages, so plantation managers hired hungry children. 
It is as if the growth and renewed vitality of the industry entailed the 
“modernization of poverty.”43
Table 5. Earnings of Banana Harvesters
 Number of fruit loads/girl
      Average Average Daily
Person Age Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Load Incomea
 1 15 75 65 75 65 70.0 140
 2 9 55 30 55 30 42.5 83
 3 8 35 65 35 40 42.8 87
 4 13 55 40 55 60 52.5 106
 5 11 45 60 45 50 50.0 100
 6 10 55 55 50 65 56.3 112
 7 8 35 65 35 25 40.0 80
 8 10 60 25 60 65 52.5 106
 9 11 75 45 75 45 60.0 120
10 12 60 60 55 60 58.8 118
11 11 55 55 60 55 56.3 112
 Overall average daily income 106
Source: Author’s fieldwork.
Note: Income in Somali shillings, based on 2 shillings per load.
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Contrary to the claims of some plantation owners and Somalfruit, 
the banana commodity was a profitable one. The large amounts of 
investment that were directed into it and the willingness with which 
planters envisioned expansions indicate that the industry was healthy. 
A rational investor would not sink more resources into enterprises 
whose profits are marginal if there is no prospect of better returns in 
the future. This assessment is supported further by a 1977 Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) study that discovered that the prob-
lem was not the absence of profits, but the distribution of profits among 
those involved in the industry, from the producer to the retailer (see 
Table 6). The return to a planter who owned a processing center (most 
planters did not own such centers), including the cost of production, 
was 11.4 percent of the retail price of the fruit at the export market, a 
net profit of 1.9 percent of that price. Table 6 also shows that the free-
on-board price was 25.2 percent of the retail price. This means that 
Table 6. Estimate of the Main Cost Elements in Banana Exports
 Percent Contribution 
 to Retail Unit Price Value
Reported production cost before harvest 8.6 
Harvesting and transport to packing plant 0.9 
Producer’s gross margin 1.9 
Estimated gross return to growers at packing plant  11.4
Packing 10.0 
Transport to port 0.6 
Loading and stevedoring 1.1 
Export tax 0.3 
Other charges 0.8 
Exporters gross margin 1.0 
Free-on-board (FOB) price  25.2
Freight and insurance 14.3 
C.I.F. price  39.5
Unloading and handling at port of discharge didiscdischarge 2.0 
Import duties 18.5 
Importers gross margin 5.5 
Free-on-rail (FOR) selling price  66.0
Ripeness gross margin 15.1 
Ripeness selling price  81.1
Retailers gross margin 18.9 
Retail price 100.0 
Source: International Labour Office, Economic Transformation in a Socialist Framework, 
1977, p. 104.
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nearly three-fourths of the value of the crop left the country. More 
recent data produced by Somalfruit show that the producer’s relative 
financial position did improve in terms of the FOB price (see Table 7). 
Using the data from the ILO as a baseline, it can be surmised that the 
producer’s share of the FOB price increased from 50.16 percent to 54.25 
percent, if the planter owned a packing station. Despite these positive 
changes, the cost of production accounted for a high proportion of 
the producer’s price, and the profit rates were very high downstream 
(all Somali banana exports were sold to De Nadai’s parent company). 
Because plantation owners had little control over either the cost of nec-
essary inputs purchased from Somalfruit or the final retail price, the 
only way they could advance their profit margins was to control other 
costs of production, particularly labor. Containing the cost of labor 
and enhancing its quality was at the heart of the labor problem in the 
plantation economy. Impoverished children were the foundation of the 
new profitability, and the returns to the country were minimal.44 Thus, 
one wonders how rational it is to use some of the most productive land 
in the country in this manner!
The civil war ruined the sector and production became nil at one 
point.45 Large swaths of this land have been taken over by warlords 
and organized gangs, and banana production and exports remain neg-
ligible despite attempts to resuscitate this system.
Table 7. Banana Free-on-Board Cost Breakdown
Cost item Dollars/quintal Percent of FOBa
Producer price 15.7 45.42
Packing station 1.64 4.74
Plastic covers 0.11 0.32
Packing (cartons and plastic) 8.11 23.46
Transport to port 1.35 3.91
Quality control 0.68 1.96
Loading and sundries 0.23 0.67
Export tax 1.47 4.25
Overhead expenses 1.83 5.29
Depreciation 1.35 3.91
Asset revaluation reserve 2.10 6.07
  Total costs to FOB 34.57 100
Source: Woodward and Stockton, A Study of the Profitability
Note: Calculated by author
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D. Fishing
Somalia has the second longest coastline on the African continent, 
nearly 1900 miles, and a huge marine economic zone. The fishery 
resources of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have substantial 
potential, which Somalis have yet to exploit. There was little devel-
opment in the sector during the old regime although it established 
a Ministry of Fisheries. The problem in the sector was one of severe 
underutilization of the resource, little infrastructural development, and 
a limited domestic market for seafood.
The state’s collapse opened up Somali coastal waters to extensive 
illegal fishing by foreign fleets, such as Taiwan, Russia, Thailand, 
Japan, and Italy. There is a serious danger that marine life and its 
ecological systems are being severely damaged. Estimates of illegal 
fishing fleets are between 650 and 900 ships. This is certain to acceler-
ate Somali impoverishment.46 The small, formerly government-owned 
fishing fleet has been appropriated by a member of the old guard 
and close associate of one of the chief warlords, who has used it as 
his private commercial enterprise. In recent years, small enterprises 
have re-emerged and the old fish canning plant in Las Qorey has been 
partially replaced. Future reconstruction programs must include the 
protection and development of this vital sector. Furthermore, any long-
term development strategy must include a program of industrializa-
tion, without which sustained improvements in the standard of living 
are not feasible.
E. The Diversity of Conditions within the Agrarian Economy
The crisis in the Somali agrarian and food sectors was not monolithic 
in nature, and the way in which it was manifested in the pastoral/
livestock economy was different from its expression in the crop and 
fishing areas. For example, although stagnation and decline occurred 
in the former, growth was a characteristic feature of the farm economy, 
a result of the liberal reform program that was instituted in the early 
1980s, while underdevelopment marked the fisheries.
The condition of the pastoral/livestock sector had two intricately 
intertwined dimensions, namely, the ecological and social aspects. 
Growth in livestock trade in the last hundred years was a result of the 
increasing demands by pastoralists to obtain manufactured commodi-
ties, as well as the added claims of non-pastoral social groups, such 
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as merchants and the state. It led to horizontal expansion of livestock 
production into more marginal areas. Such a growth strategy, com-
bined with the increase in livestock prices in the 1970s introduced by 
petrodollars from the Middle East, kept the pastoralist-merchant-state 
relationship complementary and unproblematic. The sharp decline in 
livestock prices in the Middle East reduced the profitability of Somali 
livestock exports, and the downward pressure on prices and profits 
meant, in the long run, that the old ways of resolving such a squeeze 
(e.g., herd expansion into marginal areas) were not feasible. Thus, the 
pastoral/livestock economy came to a crossroads.
The grain sector (irrigated and rain-fed) suffered from several dif-
ficulties. First, the increase in the quantity of grains from dryland farm-
ing in the 1980s was due to an expansion of the area under cultivation. 
In the absence of new farming techniques suitable to dryland areas 
or modern inputs to intensify production, rain-fed agriculture was 
unlikely to experience further significant growth because most land 
suitable for rain-fed farming was already utilized. Second, although 
irrigated grain farming (i.e., rice) had been a growth industry in the 
1980s, it began to stagnate because of poor husbandry and a lack of 
necessary supporting institutions and infrastructure. In the future, 
expansion and intensification of irrigated grain production will be 
essential in order to rehabilitate the rest of the economy.
The recovery of the plantation economy in the 1980s meant that this 
sector was not suffering from the maladies that plagued the pastoral 
economy. Prospects for further growth of plantations were very good 
prior to the collapse of the regime in 1991. As such, the problems in 
the banana economy were not ones of stagnation in later years. Rather, 
they originated from the use of scarce and precious irrigated land for 
the production of exports, three-fourths of the value of which was real-
ized outside the country. Theoretically, banana exports contributed to 
the country’s foreign exchange. However, because most of these earn-
ings remained in foreign hands overseas, the net economic impact of 
the industry on the country’s and the region’s capital accumulation 
fund was marginal. Moreover, in spite of the growth in banana exports, 
those who labored in the fields saw no improvement in their wages or 
working conditions.
Somali fisheries, which have substantial potential, have yet to be 
developed for the benefit of the country. Both the civilian and military 
regimes barely understood the significance of this resource and there-
fore did little to encourage its development. The most urgent issue is to 
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find a way to stop illegal fishing and further damage to marine ecosys-
tems. The underdevelopment of physical and institutional infrastruc-
ture was, and is, the principal problem and would require a systematic 
and effective modest plan.
IV. The State and the Economy
The poor quality or absence of state leadership has been central to 
Somalia’s economic and political misfortunes. Neither a return to the 
authoritarian and corrupt order, nor a continuation of warlordism, 
nor the adoption of a clumsy neo-liberal project is likely to nurture an 
accumulation strategy that would progressively enhance the nation’s 
quality of life and heal its deep social wounds. The vital question is: 
What is the appropriate role that the state should play in rebuilding the 
political and economic fabric of Somali society? This section explores a 
menu of options.
Many writers have been surprised by the commercial and entrepre-
neurial acumen and energy of Somalis to carry on after the disintegra-
tion of the country’s government in 1991. This attitude, premised on 
the belief that the state is essential for the sustenance of livelihoods, is 
somewhat justified since no one had any experience with stateless soci-
ety in recent history. The excitement about economic activity in a state-
less environment should wane, however, because a closer examination 
of the informal sectors in economies with states is instructive, since the 
latter have qualities similar to those of post-1991 Somalia. The informal 
sector in developing economies, although constrained by state regula-
tions, is said to be both dynamic and exploitative,47 but no one expects 
it to generate employment opportunities that can sustain even a mod-
est quality of life.
Scholars who are acquainted with the informal sector or the smug-
gling industry know the acute limits of such economies and are less 
exuberant in their commentary, but some recent writings on Somalia 
have neglected to address the limits of this economy.48 Jamal Mubarak’s 
essay is typical of this trend. He documents the energy of Somalia’s 
stateless economy and marvels at its dynamism:
In developed countries, the breakdown and subsequent long absence 
of economic institutions alone would be a devastating experience to a 
local economy. Even in small economies with a traditional subsistence 
agricultural sector, the urban monetary economy could be expected to 
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suffer a similar fate. In Somalia, however, its economy has so far proved 
to be resilient. Despite the war, recurrent droughts, famine, and the sub-
sequent serious decline in production capacity, its economy muddles 
through. Surprisingly, in some areas, the local economy is thriving and 
is experiencing an unparalleled economic boom raising the question of 
whether absence of government is a blessing in itself (italics mine).49
Although Mubarak recognizes some of the weaknesses of the stateless 
economy and the need for legitimate authority, his argument, none-
theless, unwittingly supports the minimalist role of the state, which 
neo-liberal financial institutions advocate. Others, such as Peter Little, 
are mindful of the pitfalls of an exuberant endorsement of stateless 
markets, but maintain a certain degree of enthusiasm in describing 
post-1991 economic changes, particularly those related to the livestock 
trade in Somalia’s southernmost region. Despite his prudence, Little 
implicitly sanctions a minimalist state strategy not very different from 
that of Mubarak.50
Our close observations during the last decade have convinced us 
that the economy consists of a huge informal and retail sector, and 
mafia-like and oligopolistic operations. Small entrepreneurs or busi-
nesspersons who come close to operating a legitimate business, as well 
as the majority of the indigent population, are the real victims of the 
stateless economic environment. We think that a stateless economy is 
an extreme version of neo-liberal informality. Although celebratory 
studies of the stateless economy provide some insights into the restless 
nature of the market in the post-1991 era, they have yet to articulate 
a theory that explicates the role of the state in development. In the 
absence of such a framework, these studies unwittingly accept the 
pervasive rhetoric of free markets, which entrenches a minimalist state 
argument.51
State-market relations are more complex than those imagined in 
neo-liberal strategy. We posit that, contrary to the ideology of free 
markets, two types of capitalist political economies exist: regulated 
and stateless. Regulated economies (Figure 1) usually consist of three 
sorts: free/stimulated markets, governed markets,52 and rentier mar-
kets. What sets the three apart from each other is the degree and type 
of state involvement in the operations of the market. Accordingly, in 
stimulated or free markets, government establishes a “suitable envi-
ronment for the entrepreneurs to perform their functions” by develop-
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ing and maintaining infrastructure, insuring the validity of contracts, 
and keeping law and order.53
In contrast, governed markets are those in which the state provides 
strategic guidance to the economy. Governing the market does not 
mean that the state deploys blanket regulations to control or own enter-
prises, but instead utilizes fine-tuned and discriminatory tools to help 
establish and nurture productive accumulation and discipline enter-
prises. As an earlier analyst of the South Korean experiences notes:
The Korean economy depends in large measure on private enterprise 
operating under highly centralized government guidance. In Korea the 
government’s role is considerably more direct than that of merely setting 
the broad rules of the game and in influencing the economy indirectly 
through market forces. In fact, the government seems to be a participant 
and often the determining influence in nearly all [major] business deci-
sions.54
The state’s “determining” effect entails setting clear and high perfor-
mance standards for businesses. In the limpid words of Alice Amsden:
…[t]he crucial role of government [was] not only in subsidizing cer-
tain industries to stimulate growth, but in setting stringent performance 
standards in exchange for the subsidies. In other countries—in Turkey 
and India, for example—subsidies have been dispensed primarily as 
giveaways. In Korea the “wrong” prices have been right because govern-
ment discipline over business has enabled subsidies and protection to be 
less than elsewhere and more effective.55
The purpose of such a state leadership is to foster accumulation and 
transform productivity.56 Evans has advanced these ideas by pointing 
out the four ways in which states can intervene: custodian, demiurge, 
midwifery, and husbandry.57 Which instruments are deployed and for 
Figure 1. Regulated Economies
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how long depend on the economic conditions of the time, and each 
brand is retired as the initial circumstances that necessitated its use are 
superseded. Japan pioneered the art of governing markets followed 
by the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of East Asia.58 A com-
mon element that all states mastering the art share is the managed 
synergy between political leaders, strategically located civil servants, 
and entrepreneurs.59 State engagement with any enterprise is perfor-
mance oriented and requires that the industry deliver competitive 
export products and services in a set time period. This system is not 
immune to corruption and rent-seeking but those practices have been 
significantly contained.60 The governed-market model describes how 
this triangular political-economic architecture works, and how it has 
delivered development to a select number of Third World countries.
In contrast, rentier economies are those in which the state engages in 
generalized and deeply intrusive interventions that frustrate legitimate 
enterprises and that grant favored rent-seekers plenty of opportunities 
to circumvent the general rules. Systemic corruption characterizes this 
order. This type of economy has no record of deepening accumulation 
or enhancing development. On the contrary, it is characterized by mis-
management and deep poverty. Somalia’s economy was a prototype of 
this system in the 1980s.
This schema of state-economy relations provides a menu of options 
that is at variance with the standard “advice” offered to crisis-rid-
den countries.61 The dominant international counsel to Third World 
societies is to transition from a rentier order to a free market strategy. 
There is no question that stimulated markets are superior to rentier 
systems, however the denial of the vital role of the developmentalist 
state by certain international institutions has been disingenuous.62 The 
master architects of this advice have been the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.63 These institutions have imposed such con-
straints on many crisis-ridden countries since the late 1970s. Re-engi-
neering Third World economies via structural adjustment produced 
limited success and a great deal of misery. In the face of this poor 
performance, the guardian institutions and their donor companions 
claimed that the failures were due to the absence of a democratic politi-
cal order. Consequently, they prescribed “good governance” as the 
missing catalyst that would remove domestic political blockages from 
the market’s pathways. Multi-party elections and civil service reform 
dictated by the donors have occupied center stage since the late 1980s. 
The confluence of neo-liberal demands and the desire of local people 
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to throw off the yoke of dictatorship were expected to produce a syn-
ergistic positive-sum outcome. Unfortunately, as Claude Ake so well 
observed in 1996, multi-party elections did not translate into policy-
making autonomy for countries like Zambia. Political liberalism and 
hegemonic neo-liberal economic management have yet to revitalize 
accumulation within the continent.64 As I noted in an earlier book, the 
combination of rentier African leaders and neo-liberal strategy have 
resulted in dire political-economic conditions. Somalia’s fate marks the 
ultimate manifestation of such a process.65
Finally, a careful study of this menu of options is vital if the effort to 
reconstruct Somalia’s political economy is serious. These discussions of 
stimulated/free versus governed markets may seem farfetched given 
Somalia’s condition, however I think that these circumstances provide 
an opportunity for laying the foundation for long-term development, 
the powerful constraints of the present notwithstanding. A neo-liberal 
political-economic regime in the context of the present situation will 
extend and deepen rentier havens, as is apparent from current devel-
opments, and, therefore, will impede productive accumulation. The 
point is not that Somalia can develop into a governed market in the 
short run, but that the vital institutional embryo of such a system can 
be sown now.
Somalia’s stateless economy is neither a stimulated market nor a 
governed economy. (See Figure 2) Instead, it consists of a huge infor-
mal sector, oligopolist enterprises, rentier milieus backed by the gun, 
lawlessness, and environmentally murderous operations. The defin-
ing feature of this order is the complete absence of public authority 
and security, and the utter neglect of public investment. This economy 
could be partitioned into four divisions: warlord-controlled business, 
Figure 2. Stateless Economy
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business-lord-owned enterprises, oligopolistic industry, and small 
enterprises in retail, service, and production.
The warlord-controlled sectors have included former state assets, 
such as airports, dispossessed plantations and farmland, illegal char-
coal production and export, and illegal fishing.66 The warlord is the 
sole owner and he controls the revenues to pay his private militias and 
accumulate wealth. Business lords have operated in a parallel way 
since they import and export whatever they can sell and they have few 
competitors. They control most of the armed militias, which are used to 
guard their operations. Some of their members have made substantial 
fortunes and operate both inside and outside the country. The business 
lords are dissimilar to the warlords since most of them do not control 
public assets. Yet their reach gives them advantages over smaller enter-
prises that do not have the resources to establish strong militias.
The third group of big enterprises has been the oligopolistic tele-
phone and money transfer operations. Telephone operations have two 
contradictory images. First, they are known to provide the cheapest 
telephone rates in Africa. Second, they are inefficient operations since a 
customer of one firm cannot communicate with a customer of another 
company. Consequently, each customer must have several separate 
telephone lines to communicate with others, and all the companies 
have been reluctant to form an integrated system (although some prog-
ress has been made in this regard). Money transfer companies operate 
along the same lines as the telephone companies. Each firm can only 
transfer money to its branches located in Somalia and elsewhere in 
the Somali-inhabited areas, and customers are underserved when the 
company at the point of origination does not have facilities at the 
recipient’s end. Money transfer businesses are cost-effective operations 
despite the absence of an integrated money transfer network.
Both the telephone and money transfer companies reach a larger 
number of places and customers than the old government’s services 
ever reached. This is in large measure due to the development of tele-
phone technology since the late 1980s. Their services are certainly an 
advance over previous systems, but it should not be a reason for com-
placency. Telephone and money transfer charges are relatively cheap 
by regional standards, but what makes their cost low is not the local 
population’s high income but the fact that the payers of the charges 
are often diaspora residents. Furthermore, neither operation pays taxes 
and therefore does not contribute to public funds used for improving 
public services and infrastructure.
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The biggest sector of the economy, measured by the sheer number 
of people involved, is the retail commercial and productive sector. 
Included in this area are those engaged in professional services (such 
as clinics), owners of well-stocked retail stores, market women who 
sell a few vegetables and milk, small farmers and livestock owners, 
and artisans such as blacksmiths. Other members of the population, 
who do not own any assets and who do not receive remittances, live 
on starvation wages or handouts. The “buzz” of the market is great-
est in this sector as people hustle to survive. Few studies have looked 
beneath the bustle to see the market’s soft underbelly and the impover-
ished lives of those caught up in this context.
What is described above is the terrain in which a new Somali state 
must engage. How can it turn the transition into a formative produc-
tive process? The prognosis is demoralizing, given the current struc-
ture of the economy and the highly corrupt process that produced the 
Transitional Federal Government. Despite the incompetence and the 
fraudulent behavior and record of many members of the TFG, there 
may still be a chance to reverse the calamity and begin something 
new.
V. Recovery and Reinventions: 
Correspondence between State and Market
Neither the formation of an ill-defined and bloated federal system of 
government, dominated by rapacious rentiers, nor a recovery policy 
guided by neo-liberal strategy can be a sound recipe for the reestab-
lishment of peaceful coexistence or economic renewal. The destruc-
tion of the Somali state was a calamity of extraordinary proportions, 
inducing nearly two decades of devastation. However, it can be turned 
into a precious opportunity if modest and effective state institutions 
take root. This is because social resuscitation and economic rejuvena-
tion will require a strong state, not a repressive and authoritarian one. 
Its strategy should be graduated and prioritized along the following 
lines: restore law and order, establish a transparent land tenure system, 
restore property rights, and, finally, put into place a general strategy 
of development. A key mandate of such a state should begin with an 
approach to help reorganize the productive sectors of the economy in 
such a way that production for local needs is of utmost priority. More 
specifically, this new state should not engage in production, but should 
act as an efficient facilitator and coordinator. The ultimate measure of 
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the state’s effectiveness in revitalizing the economy should be the rate 
of growth in production and fairness in the distribution of produc-
tive assets among the population. In short, the new polity’s ambition 
should be the difficult tasks of growth and equity.
Unfortunately, the alliance of local merchants of violence and rent-
iers, and an international community disinclined to push for real peace 
or assist the Somali people in regaining their autonomy, are the chief 
barriers against the type of recovery that can lead to a viable society. In 
addition, the extreme fragmentation of the Somali people has made it 
difficult to challenge these dominant forces. This is not an easy context 
in which to establish the foundation of a governed market economy. 
However, the strategy should be to initiate the formation of institutions 
that will guide national development after peace and reconciliation is 
restored. This can be done by establishing an autonomous national com-
mission during the transition whose task will be to plan and initiate the 
embryos of such institutions.
Beyond the transition, the agenda should be to devise a strategy 
that will deepen production. What form will such a scheme take in the 
agricultural sector? The first major effort will be the coordination of 
agrarian reform in the three sectors analyzed here. Such a program will 
endeavor to remove any fetters on production, ensure sustainability, 
and enhance national capital accumulation. Reform in the pastoral/
livestock sector will affect four aspects: marketing, veterinary, water 
services, and, ultimately, range management. Marketing reform will 
entail significant changes by establishing markets in strategic locations 
that producers can easily reach to unload their stock. Transport from 
these markets to the main ports can be licensed to serve the livestock 
sector. This reorganization will reduce the vast number of those unpro-
ductively employed, which currently draws resources from the sector 
without adding value to it. Second, a semi-public shipping company 
can be created which will own and manage ships that transport live-
stock and other commodities to and from the export markets of the 
Middle East. Making livestock shipment an integral part of the local 
economy will ensure that a significant amount of the revenue gener-
ated—currently captured by foreign interests—stays in the local econ-
omy, enhancing the overall profitability of the sector. These marketing 
arrangements should operate on a commercial basis, and must have 
autonomous managerial staff. The state’s responsibility is to ensure 
that these terms are respected. Veterinary services will be provided by 
an autonomous agency of a Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. Again, such 
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a public organization will operate on a commercial basis, although 
the state will subsidize it for the first five years, as the agency builds 
its assets. The purpose of such an arrangement is to make the service 
delivery system more responsive to the needs of the producers, but also 
to keep a close eye on public safety and interest. Further, the develop-
ment of water resources for the pastoral economy can be managed by 
a national water resources board within the ambit of the Agrarian Min-
istry, in close consultation with regional producer associations. Control 
and use of water resources on the pastoral range is pivotal in undertak-
ing sustainable pastoral development because of the absence of other 
sound and appropriate methods of range management. Finally, the 
fundamental objectives of pastoral/livestock reform are to: (1) increase 
the returns to producers by incorporating more economic activities into 
their sphere; (2) secure responsiveness of public agencies who serve 
producers; (3) enhance producer participation in setting national pol-
icy that affects their well-being; and (4) use foreign exchange earnings 
for productive purposes in that and complementary sectors. Agrarian 
reform in the farm sector will necessitate land (re)distribution, restitu-
tion, reorientation of resource use to aim for national food self-reliance, 
environmental conservation, and the establishment and development 
of effective and accountable institutions to serve a growing economy. 
The purpose of land (re)distribution is to ensure equitable access to this 
increasingly scarce but precious asset. Although farm size distribution 
will depend on the ecological conditions of particular areas (e.g., irri-
gated/riverine versus rain-fed), a basic farm size of three hectares per 
household could be envisaged in the riverine environments. A resur-
rection program should also guarantee access to riverine irrigation to 
farmers, as well as grazing and watering rights to pastoralists. Finally, 
such a program should not allow for absentee ownership.
These changes should be designed and implemented by a national 
agency attached to a Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and regionally based 
Councils of Farmers. Such councils will be central to a democratically 
elected body whose purpose is to promote equity of resource distribu-
tion and represent farmers’ interests in regional and national forums. 
An organization of this kind can also function as a marketing structure 
whose books are open to public scrutiny. The rationale for such an 
organization and its relationship to the state is to guard the interests of 
the farming population and secure a national agenda in the farm sec-
tor.
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A land reform program will directly and comprehensively affect 
the plantation economy in several ways. First, land resources will be 
redistributed, based on the three-hectare farm size, to those who have 
worked on plantations and to others in the surrounding areas. The 
idea here is to get away from the plantation system. Second, these 
small farmers will become part of a household-based, food-export-pro-
ducing agricultural system. The emphasis of the farm sector, particu-
larly in high-potential areas, will be food production for local markets. 
However, a portion of household land (e.g., a third) can be devoted to 
export crop production. Marketing and transportation of export crops 
will be within the purview of farmers’ cooperatives. Again, the pur-
pose is to increase returns to farmers and encourage productive use 
of resources. Thus, public policy in the agrarian economy must ensure 
that the foreign exchange (saved by the growth of domestic food pro-
duction and also that earned by livestock/meat and crop exports) is 
used to further enhance the productive capacities in these and other 
emerging areas. Such a program, and the subsequent growth in the 
sector, will begin to provide a stable basis for national economic recov-
ery.
The basic function of an agrarian ministry will be to conduct field-
based research, in concert with a rehabilitated college of agriculture; 
deliver farm inputs to farmers’ associations; watch over the develop-
ment, management, and maintenance of irrigation systems; and pur-
sue environmental conservation.
Fisheries have great promise but will require tremendous support 
from the new government. There will be a need to establish an auton-
omous marine affairs agency, run on commercial grounds after the 
initial five years, that would regulate the industry and help support 
initial investment to get the sector off the ground. As in the agrarian 
reform program, the priority will be to facilitate the development of 
small fishing enterprises and overseas marketing.
Finally, the enormous but necessary task of transforming the coun-
try’s agrarian economy is an issue still outside the scope of current 
discussions among Somalis. A program, such as sketched here, will 
require an unprecedented degree of foresight, coupled with disci-
plined intellect and efficiency, and must be carried forward by col-
laboration between a steady public force and producers. The kind of 
coordination and market guidance that this will demand will come 
not through the guise of local Bantustans, but through a responsive 
and effective national state determined to engage the exacting balance 
Bildhaan  Vol. 7
164
between growth and equity. The likelihood of creating a sustainable 
economy in a peaceful and united Somalia is quite remote without 
such a state. An essential companion to this state is an autonomous 
and democratically organized agrarian population that can hold the 
political authority accountable. This is the basis for a viable civil soci-
ety, and it has the potential to create broad-based cross-regional alli-
ances of producers that will supersede the self-defeating animosities 
engendered by the polarization of clanism. A social arrangement of 
this kind calls for household ownership of productive resources and 
for cooperative organizations of producers geared to the provision of 
necessary services. The strengthening of civil society and the state on 
their own terms necessitates a different kind of democracy than any-
thing Somalis have created thus far. If the political history of the first 
nine years of the country taught us anything, it is that the numerous 
parties that competed in the last election had the identical motive of 
raiding the public purse for individual gain. Siyaad Barre and clanis-
tic militarism turned the looting of the commons into a crude and 
poisonous art. Warlords, factional, and regional pretenders have only 
worsened the syndrome and, thus, have created dead ends. Institu-
tionalizing clanism and rentier officials via a federal form of govern-
ment will not only be a farce, but will precipitate further descent into 
the pit of pauperism and sectarian savagery. The recent people’s revolt 
in Mogadishu and the Benadir region, and the appearance, albeit no 
more, of the Union of Islamic Courts, offered a glimpse of the yearning 
of the Somali people.
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